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Book Reviews 
FAREWELL TO SOCIAL NOSTALGIA 
BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND 
LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE. By Edward L. 
Rubin. 1 Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2005. Pp. 
471. $45.00. 
Peter E. Quint 
In Beyond Camelot, Edward Rubin advances what seems 
like a pretty radical program. He argues that the advent of the 
administrative state has fundamentally changed the nature of 
government. As a result, traditional categories of law and politi-
cal theory have lost their relevance and descriptive power; in-
deed these categories now reflect a sort of "social nostalgia" 
which impairs understanding (pp. 29-36). Among these obsolete 
categories are such hallowed concepts as branches of govern-
ment (and the separation of powers), power and discretion, de-
mocracy, legitimacy, law, legal rights, human rights, and prop-
erty. 
Should these obsolete terms, therefore, be completely 
abandoned? Rubin's answer is no. Rather these terms should be 
"bracketed" -that is, put to one side for the purposes of a 
thought experiment-and certain alternative concepts should be 
explored (pp. 8, 336). Rubin believes that these alternative con-
cepts are superior in three essential ways. First, the alternative 
concepts are superior in expressing our "emotional commit-
ments" to the view that "the government's purpose is to benefit 
1. Dean & John Wade-Kent Syvcrud Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University 
Law School. 
2. Jacob A. France Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Maryland 
School of Law. This review is a revised version of comments delivered at the 2006 An-
nual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, July 7, 2006, in Baltimore, Maryland. 
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its citizens" by effectively furthering their "security, prosperity 
and liberty" (pp. 14-15). Second, the alternative concepts pro-
mote greater clarity in thinking, because they better resist reifi-
cation-that is, they more adequately reveal or acknowledge 
that all such terms of political philosophy are actually "meta-
phors, rather than observable features of the world" (pp. 15-18). 
And, finally, the alternative concepts encourage a deeper exami-
nation of political institutions because they facilitate "micro-
analysis" of how decisions actually are made in government-
that is, they "provide the framework" for our attempts "to trace 
the actual pathways of individual decision making and related 
action through an institutional structure" 3 (p. 18). 
The old concepts cannot be completely abandoned because 
that would be confusing and (in the end) impossible. "Instead", 
according to Rubin, "the idea is to convey a sense of caution to 
scholars, judges, and policy analysts whose task it is to think sys-
tematically about modern government" (pp. 335-36). But is it 
really worth a volume of over three hundred pages-with a daz-
zling apparatus of extraordinary learning-merely to "convey a 
sense of caution to scholars, judges, and policy analysts"? 
Perhaps it is. In any case, let us undertake our own brief 
"microanalysis" of Rubin's impressive work of political and legal 
theory. 
1. "Branches" and "Network" 
The first of Rubin's proposals is that the metaphor of three 
"branches" of government (and of the separation of powers) 
should be bracketed, and that government should be viewed in-
stead as a "network" (pp. 40-73, 184-85). Certainly the "net-
work" metaphor well captures the complexity and decentraliza-
tion of aspects of American government, and Rubin elaborates 
this point in a particularly persuasive discussion (pp. 53-66). 
But does this terminology violate the spirit of Article II of 
the Constitution which, some argue, requires a rigidly central-
ized executive branch? Article II does vest the executive power 
in a single "President of the United States," responsible for the 
faithful execution of the laws.4 But the argument for a central-
3. For Rubin's previous discussion of "microanalysis" -and an argument that a 
"microanalysis of institutions" could provide the focus for a new synthesis in legal schol-
arship-see Edward L. Rubin, Commentary: The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of 
Discourse, and the Microanalysis of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1424-38 (1996). 
4. U.S. CONST. Art. II,§§ 1, 3. 
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ized hierarchy becomes weaker when we consider the details. 
First, Congress may allow the "heads of departments" or the 
"courts of law" to appoint most executive officials.5 Moreover, 
the President (unlike Congress) receives no express power to 
remove any office-holder. Only a massive effort of strenuous in-
terpretation allowed the Court to infer a presidential removal 
power in the Myers case, over eminent dissents. Yet something 
like the network idea reasserted itself in Humphrey's Executor, 
the decision that validated the independent administrative agen-
cies by finding that Congress could generally insulate commis-
sioners from removal in the absence of good cause.6 
Indeed, that was what the fighting was all about in the spe-
cial prosecutor case, Morrison v. Olson7: is our administration 
part of a hierarchical executive "branch" or is it more like a 
"network"? By upholding the independence of the prosecutor, 
the Court seemed to endorse something like the "network" idea. 
The cri de coeur of Justice Scalia's dissent could be viewed as a 
nostalgic backward look at what he feared might be the disap-
pearing idea of the "unitary" executive department as a separate 
"branch". (But, of course, this idea has not disappeared, as the 
continuing validity of cases like INS v. Chadha8 and Bowsher v. 
Synar9 makes clear.) 
The idea of a "network" may be useful for characterizing 
foreign administrative systems as well. In Germany, for example, 
most federal law is administered by the individual states 
(Lander), rather than by a federal bureaucracy. 10 Under this 
form of decentralized administrative system, federal law may be 
enforced differently, depending upon the prevailing politics of 
the enforcing state. 11 But Justice Scalia rejected this sort of 
5. U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 2. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 240 (1926) 
(Brandeis, 1., dissenting, quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION§ 1544). 
6. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935); see also Wiener v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958). 
7. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
8. 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down the "legislative veto"). Rubin refers to the 
basis of the Court's opinion in Chadha as "merely another emanation of the three-branch 
metaphor" (p. 71). 
9. 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (finding that executive authority may not be exercised by an 
officer who is responsible to Congress). 
On the other hand, Miscreua v. United Scates, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), more easily fits 
the pattern of government as a "network." In Mistreua, the Court found that Congress 
could permissibly authorize federal judges to exercise a form of rulemaking authority in 
the United States Sentencing Commission. 
10. Sec Art. 83 GG. 
11. The Constitutional Court's first abortion decision in 1975, for example, required 
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"network" in the Printz case when (writing for the Court) he 
noted that allowing a federal statute to employ the civil service 
of the states to enforce federal law would be to remove these of-
ficials from unified central- that is, presidential- control. 12 
But, however useful it may be in capturing certain realities 
of the American administrative state, Rubin's proposed network 
image also raises concerns. There is nothing in the concept of the 
"network" that replaces the idea-important in the "branches" 
metaphor and the separation of powers-that the structure of 
government is designed to protect individual liberty. Thus, in 
shifting away from the separation of powers, we seem to lose the 
ideas expressed, in perhaps nostalgic language, by Justice 
Brandeis who declared that this doctrine was not adopted "to 
promote efficiency" (i.e., the administrative state) "but to pre-
clude the exercise of arbitrary power"- to create friction in or-
der to "save the people from autocracy." 13 
2. "Democracy" and "Interaction"; "Legitimacy" and 
"Compliance" 
While the image of the network may well yield important 
benefits, Rubin's next proposals-that we "bracket" the term 
democracy and speak about "interaction" with government or an 
"interactive republic" instead (Ch. 4; pp. 110-43), and that we 
replace talk of "legitimacy" with the concept of "compliance" 
(Ch. 5; pp. 144-78)-seem considerably more problematic. 
The shift from legitimacy to compliance interestingly paral-
lels what could be called a modern shift in legal theory from 
natural law to positivism: the concept of legitimacy is consistent 
with a natural law approach because it presupposes an external 
standard against which the existing legal system may be meas-
an clastic "social'' hardship exception to the general rule that abortion must be criminal-
izcd. 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975). States with Social Democratic governments interpreted this 
exception in a broad manner, thereby expanding the abortion right, while more conserva-
tive state governments sought to reduce abortion through a narrow interpretation. 
12. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,922-23 (1997). 
13. Myers, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
As a sort of pendant to the idea of "network," Rubin argues that the concept of 
"power'' (as in the wielding of administrative power, or the delegation of power) should 
be replaced by "authorization"; Rubin notes that this metaphor avoids the misleading 
implication that power, in this context, is an actual thing that is passed from one person 
to another, or is applied by one person to, or against, another. Rubin argues that the term 
"authorization" is more accurate and opens up substantially greater opportunities for 
microanalysis. For similar reasons, Rubin argues that adoption of the term "supervision" 
will allow us to dispense with the bracketed concept of "discretion." (pp. 74-109, 185-
86). 
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ured. On the other hand, the great positivists of the 19th and 
20th Centuries-Austin, Kelsen, and H.L.A. Hart-base their 
systems on the idea of compliance. For those writers, there is no 
fundamental idea of "legitimacy" which determines what the 
valid legal rules are. Rather the system of law that is in fact "effi-
cacious" is the law. 14 
But can the American government really be adequately de-
scribed without the twin terms democracy and legitimacy? In-
deed, is it not the idea of democracy-that is, the idea that the 
government rests on some deep if diffuse popular approval-
that gives legitimacy to the system? (Incidentally, I am skeptical 
of Rubin's view that, in contemporary thinking, democracy still 
carries with it a residue of its meaning in Aristotle-requiring as-
sembly of the citizens in person and choice of officials by lot (pp. 
115-16)). 
And this is the important point: Rubin's analysis rests on 
popular compliance, but doesn't compliance itself rest to a sub-
stantial extent on the people's sense of the legitimacy of the gov-
ernment-at least the quality of compliance that is necessary for 
a vigorous administrative state? Indeed, the fitful and grudging 
compliance in the former East Bloc countries, which so power-
fully contributed to the downfall of the Soviet Union, seems to 
have resulted in part from a lack of legitimacy-that is, the sense 
that the structures and personnel of government had little to do 
with the consent or wishes of the governed.15 
3. "Law," "Policy" and "Implementation" 
Rubin also proposes that the term "law" be bracketed and 
be replaced with two related terms: "policy" and its "implemen-
tation." Rubin points out that this shift leads to advantages in 
analysis. This is a fair enough goal, but one might question 
whether this shift is really necessary in light of the fact that for 
many decades people have thought about law in terms of policy 
and its implementation. One might well question Rubin's ironic 
view of law as a concept that "still resonates with assertions that 
14. That is not to say that-for the positivists-the existing law is not subject to 
criticism on religious or moral grounds. Indeed, the positivists are careful to preserve 
such a possibility, and some even assert that the positivist view makes such criticism en-
tirely more likely. See H. L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 210 (2d ed. 1994). 
15. Rubin interprets the decline of the Soviet Union somewhat differently, finding 
that it was due to the failure of "socialist legitimacy" (p. 176). Indeed, in general, Rubin 
argues that compliance rests on the goods delivered by the administrative state, rather 
than on any popular sense of legitimacy (id.). 
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law constitutes the voice of God Himself, and possesses the same 
in-built regularities as the physical world" (p. 209). Who really 
thinks of law that way today? 
Indeed, as far back as the great case of McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 16 for example, the concepts of "policy" and "implementa-
tion" were drawn in the most vivid way-in Chief Justice Mar-
shall's distinction between the "ends" of federal policy 
(commerce, taxation, defense) and the "means" for the "imple-
mentation" of those policies, the Second Bank of the United 
States. 
Rubin actually acknowledges this point, when he declares 
that our Constitution is a "[product] of the administrative era," 
reflecting "the articulation of governmental purpose" (p. 224). 
But this view leads to Rubin's paradoxical conclusion that the 
"constraints" imposed on government by the American Consti-
tution-a document that proclaims itself to be "the supreme law 
of the land" -in fact "do not correspond to our concept of law" 
(p. 225). 
4. Legal Rights 
In trying to come to grips with Rubin's challenging discus-
sion of legal rights in the following chapter (pp. 227-59), we 
could start with Chief Justice Marshall's famous opinion in Mar-
bury v. Madison. 17 At the outset of the opinion Marshall first 
asks whether the applicant Marbury has a right to the commis-
sion he is seeking; then as a second question, Marshall asks: "If 
[Marbury] has a right, and that right has been violated, do the 
laws of his country afford him a remedy?" 18 This is a very clear 
formulation of what might be considered the pre-modern view in 
which legal rights are thought to have an existence that is sepa-
rate from (and prior to) their judicial enforcement. 19 Holmes and 
the realists seemed to fl~ this idea by arguing that without a 
remedy there is no right. 2 Rubin persuasively expands this point 
by noting that a "right" may be doomed to nonexistence not 
only if the applicable legal doctrine fails to provide a remedy, but 
16. 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316 (1819). 
17. 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803). 
18. !d. at 154. 
19. Although Marshall goes on to argue that a "government of laws, and not of 
men" must provide a remedy for a violation of a right-and that to fail to do so would 
cast "obloquy" on American jurisprudence-it is clear that Marshall considers the two 
terms to be conceptually quite distinct. !d. at 163. 
20. Sec, e.g., O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
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also if the remedy provided is unavailable for practical reasons, 
such as the impecuniousness of the litigant (pp. 235-37). 
Rubin also argues that the concept of legal rights is "under-
inclusive," because many important goods provided by the ad-
ministrative state, such as national defense, cannot really be the 
subject of legal rights or adjudication. "[T]he concept of legal 
rights," therefore, "underemphasizes governmental actions that 
are implemented by non-adjudicatory means ... " (pp. 233-35). 
Accordingly, Rubin would bracket the concept of legal rights 
and focus entirely on the remedy-the "cause of action" -a fo-
cus that will help us understand that legal process is only one 
method of reaching policy goals, and that we should also search 
for other methods of implementation21 (pp. 236-46). 
On the question of "rights," I would like to raise two is-
sues-one technical and the other more fundamental, addressed 
in section (5) below. First, the technical problem. The phrase 
"cause of action" may not adequately replace the phrase "legal 
rights" because "legal rights" are raised not only by plaintiffs (or 
moving parties) but also by defendants as well: that is, "legal 
rights" give rise not only to "causes of action" but also to de-
fenses against causes of action-as, for example, when an indi-
vidual is prosecuted for speech protected by the First Amend-
ment or, in the civil context, when a trespass defendant claims an 
easement on the property. Accordingly, Rubin may need two 
terms-not only "cause of action" but also (echoing Hohfeld) 
"no cause of action" (p. 229). 
5. "Human Rights" and "Moral Demands on Government" 
In his discussion of "rights" (Chapters 7 and 8) Rubin dis-
tinguishes between "legal rights" which arise from rules set 
down by the government for citizens, and "human rights"-
claims arising from "law, or lawlike moral principles," which rule 
the government itself (p. 227). While, as we have seen, Rubin 
wishes to substitute the idea of a "cause of action" for "legal 
rights," he also seeks to "bracket" the concept of "human rights" 
and substitute a new concept "moral demands on government" 
21. In a very thoughtful discussion, Rubin also argues that a focus on "causes of 
action" instead of "legal rights" would have avoided confusions of the Burger Court in 
searching for "liberty" or "property" interests in due process cases after the Court's abo-
lition of the right/privilege distinction in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (pp. 251-
56). See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 
593 (1972). Rubin indicates that this doctrine is "confused by reified heuristics inherited 
from the pre-administrative state" (pp. 254-56). 
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(pp. 268-70). According to Rubin, this new vocabulary will ac-
knowledge the important role of the administrative state in ef-
fectuating these guarantees and will tend to equalize the role of 
"positive" guarantees (welfare, education, housing) and tradi-
tional "negative" guarantees (freedom of speech, freedom 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, etc.) (pp. 274-78). 
Rubin suggests, moreover, that "moral demands on govern-
ment" is superior because the vocabulary of human rights may 
encourage the government "to adopt a deontological position 
about the essential character of human beings ... to define hu-
manity or the meaning of human existence" in a manner that 
may ultimately be oppressive (pp. 278-84). 
Whatever merit these arguments may have with respect to 
human rights in the abstract, it seems to me that this proposal 
places the idea of actual constitutional rights-which Rubin in-
cludes among the "human rights" -in a peculiar and vulnerable 
position. The whole idea of modern judicial review is that consti-
tutional rights are another form of "hard" law-just as much a 
form of legal right as the right to recover on a contract, and not 
to be classified along with somewhat less "law-like" forms. This 
disquietude is heightened by the phrase "moral demands on 
government" -which sounds like something that is considerably 
more malleable and less reliable than constitutional rights: "mo-
rality," while often implicit in enforceable rules, also has a cer-
tain aspirational tone. 
Indeed, the entire shift from a focus on the individual (in 
the idea of rights) to a primary focus on the structure of govern-
ment (implicit in "moral demands on government") also seems 
dangerous (as Rubin apparently acknowledges (p. 294)). Even 
though Rubin argues that he intends no change in the existing 
content of the guarantees (p. 298), it is not entirely clear that we 
know how to determine if these moral demands on government 
have been met. Could the "moral demands" with respect to 
freedom of expression be met, for example, by greater govern-
ment subsidies to the press, coupled with a bit more prosecution 
of seditious libel? The individualist idea of "rights" at the very 
least discourages (and probably prohibits) trade-offs of this na-
ture. The focus on government instead of individuals at least 
opens the door to possibilities of this kind. 
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6. "Property and "Market-Generating Allocation" 
In his final chapter on "property" (pp. 296-329), Rubin-in 
an exciting discussion that tests the boundaries of our thinking 
on the subject-expands the insight of the American legal real-
ists that "property" is not a thing in itself, pre-existing society, 
but rather a creation of the state that requires government for 
the enforcement mechanisms that make it possible. According to 
Rubin, the concept of "control," which Rubin finds at the basis 
of the traditional idea of property, is inconsistent with the pre-
suppositions of contemporary government (pp. 296-309). Ac-
cordingly, Rubin proposes that we "bracket" the concept of 
property completely and replace it with the "market-generating 
allocations" that the government finds to be most effective for 
achieving the chosen ends of public policy through the adminis-
trative state (pp. 314-15). 
This view of the subject supports much of the Supreme 
Court's doctrine on "regulatory takings," and is also generally 
consistent with such cases as Berman v. Parke?2 and the recent 
Kelo23 decision, which confirm that governments have great lee-
way in making general plans that may reallocate individuals' 
houses, businesses, etc. (with compensation) to further some 
greater societal good. 
Yet the very last couple of pages in the property discussion 
(pp. 327-29) do give one pause. Rubin acknowledges that the 
exercise of eminent domain, even with compensation, may lead 
to governmental oppression. The word "oppression" is used a 
number of times (in one or another form) and the courts are as-
signed the task of invalidating the exercise of eminent domain 
"that is designed to oppress individuals rather than implement a 
valid public purpose" (p. 329). This discussion seems vague and 
inconclusive, and I think that is for one basic reason: Rubin has 
abandoned the vocabulary that could be useful for the protec-
tion of individuals. We have no more constitutional or human 
rights-such as rights of freedom of speech or association, whose 
exercise might protect against "oppression"- we just have moral 
demands on government. 
In this light, I would like to conclude with a personal recol-
lection. In January 1990, shortly after the Berlin Wall was 
opened, I visited Berlin and East Germany. It was quite an ex-
22. 348 u.s. 26 (1954). 
23. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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traordinary period- "liberal revolution"24 was in the air. At that 
early point, German unification still seemed some years away, 
and East Germany was thought to need a new democratic consti-
tution, at least for an interim period. People were discussing 
what that new constitution should contain, and groups across the 
country were already working on proposed drafts. 
In these two weeks, I interviewed people across the political 
spectrum in East Germany about their views of a constitution?5 
It was clear what they wanted. They had of course been the sub-
jects of an administrative state and (for those at least who were 
content to stay put and keep their mouths shut) that state had 
had its benefits. But the administrative state-even enriched by 
the bounty of the capitalist "economic wonderland" which they 
had seen on TV across the border-was obviously not all that 
they wanted. 
They also wanted the basic features of western constitution-
alism as they saw them, and these included concepts that, in 
Rubin's vocabulary, form the subject of "social nostalgia." They 
wanted a form of the separation of powers (not a network; the 
idea of the network would not have carried the same force). 
They wanted democracy (popular sovereignty, and not just in-
teraction). They wanted legitimacy (compliance without legiti-
macy was not enough); and-above all-they wanted judicially 
enforceable human rights that inhered in individuals; they 
probably would not have been satisfied with moral demands on 
government. 
Maybe these people were filled with illusion about the tan-
gible benefits that "liberal revolution" could bring them-
indeed, many were seriously disappointed by the results. But this 
experience suggested to me-and I think these observations 
could be multiplied across the East Bloc countries of the pe-
riod-that these traditional concepts, Rubin's bracketed terms, 
probably represent very deep human aspirations. 
So we should return to Rubin's basic framework: this is a 
thought experiment, in which we are testing more traditional 
concepts-perhaps even by exaggerating a bit the omnipresence 
and importance of the administrative state. The method yields 
important insights-certainly our view of political theory has 
been very greatly enriched. But in the end we should remember 
24. See BRCCE ACKERMAN, THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION (1992). 
25. For a contemporary report, see Peter E. Quint, Building New Institutions in 
East Germany, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 21, 1990, p.lE. 
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that, even in Rubin's view, the traditional concepts are only 
bracketed- they are not gone. 
